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Chapter 5 – the APRA wars and the  
Rome Conference 
 
The beginning of the APRA wars 
APRA campaigned on various fronts. In 1926, the collecting society 
pursued a parallel campaign to secure remuneration from the owners of 
entertainment venues. In doing so, it began to touch the nerves of 
politicians and the public in ways that were scarcely evident in its 
negotiations with the broadcasters. It encountered organised and 
vociferous opposition from cinema exhibitors represented by the 
Federated Picture Showmen’s Association, agricultural societies 
represented by the Queensland Chamber of Agricultural Societies, and, 
most forcefully, municipal and shire associations represented most 
effectively by the Local Government Association of NSW. 
APRA reached agreements with the cinema exhibitors in 1926 and 
1928 – though in both instances the contracts signed by the Federated 
Picture Showmen’s Association caused great resentment1 – but its 
efforts to persuade local government, or any public association, to 
accept an obligation to pay copyright fees for performances in public 
halls, were conspicuously unsuccessful. When the Royal Commission 
on Performing Rights reported in 1933, only 20 municipal or shire halls 
in the whole of Australia were licensed by APRA for the public 
performance of musical works. 
According to the Royal Commission’s report, the local government 
associations objected to APRA’s charges not on the grounds that they 
were excessive but that they should not be made at all. Not all owners 
of public halls resisted the principle that copyright owners should be 
remunerated for the public performance of their works. But, with 
exceptions, they refused to countenance payments to APRA on the 
grounds that the Association made claims for payment without proof 
that it did so on behalf of the owners of the works performed, and that 
                                                     
1 Many cinema owners refused to join the agreement and the Cinematograph 
Exhibitors’ Associations of Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western 
Australia bitterly attacked APRA. 
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even if it proved agency, it refused to demonstrate how, and to whom, 
it distributed income collected.  
A recurrent theme of opposition to APRA, expressed by all the classes 
of users on whom the collecting society levied copyright fees, was that 
while users did not object to direct payment of reasonable fees to 
copyright owners, they did not accept that APRA’s charges were 
reasonable, and they doubted its willingness – or ability – to fairly 
distribute revenue to individual owners. 
Compulsory arbitration 
In the case of the cinema exhibitors, APRA succeeded in overcoming 
commercial opposition perhaps because it was intensely motivated by 
the prospect of large financial returns. In 1926, cinemas, soon to play 
talking films, still hired orchestras, or pianists or organists, to play an 
accompaniment to silent films screened. For APRA, fees for these 
performances represented possible revenue that would be exceeded 
only by that provided by the A Class stations.  
Negotiations with the Federated Picture Showmen’s Association were 
at first difficult. Walter Marks, a parliamentary colleague of Attorney 
General Latham, chaired the 1928 Royal Commission on the Moving 
Picture Industry in Australia, and lobbied Latham on behalf of the 
Showmen’s Association. As he said in a letter in April 1926, the 
“position is clearly one of ‘bargaining’, but according to Mr Howe [the 
Association’s President] two conferences have left the position as 
formerly existing extortion as compared with England and America.”  
His next comment raised the question that was to occupy much of the 
attention of the Royal Commission on Performing Rights. “It would 
appear,” said his letter, “that the parties cannot get before an Arbitrator 
without an amendment to the Act.” To cure the perceived legislative 
defect, Marks submitted to Latham “three amendments of the 
Copyright Act for your consideration”.  
One of these proposals provided that if parties could not agree a 
copyright performance fee their dispute would be settled by arbitration. 
The copyright legislation allowed for voluntary arbitration but APRA 
regarded the idea of a compulsory requirement as anathema. Seven 
years later, it resolutely opposed the Royal Commission’s proposal for 
the Government to add a compulsory arbitration clause to the 
Copyright Act. 
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The remaining proposals concerned registration of musical copyrights 
and reservation of performing rights as preconditions for the 
enforcement of rights but they found no favour with government 
(although they were not immediately dismissed out of hand). Latham 
pointed out later to interested politicians, as well as copyright user 
groups, that the Berne Convention’s prohibition of copyright 
formalities precluded adoption of these legislative suggestions. 
Latham passed Marks’s proposals to the Solicitor General asking for “a 
report and recommendation upon the question raised” and observing 
that if APRA’s rates were extortionate, as alleged, “it would appear that 
some alteration should be made in the Act unless [APRA] is prepared 
to reduce its proposed charges.” However, the Showmen’s Association 
relieved him of the need for further direct action, reaching agreement 
with APRA on rates in April 1926. 
APRA and the cinemas 
Many cinema exhibitors grudgingly accepted the terms of the 
agreement, which were negotiated at conferences chaired by Percy 
Deane, the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department.2  
Others joined a new agreement in 1928, which introduced new and 
increased tariffs. But all bitterly attacked what they looked upon as 
profiteering by APRA. As the complaints multiplied, the atmosphere of 
distrust poisoned the Showmen’s Association’s relationship with 
APRA. By 1932 APRA refused to negotiate with any association 
representing exhibitors and concentrated on issuing individual licences 
to cinema exhibitors. 
The report of the Royal Commission on Performing Rights made plain 
the sympathies of the single Royal Commissioner. He called APRA’s 
refusal to negotiate, “unfortunate … particularly in view of the 
conciliatory attitude of the exhibitors before the Commission.” 
According to the report, the “difficulties of the exhibitor … are great 
… he is met with claims for performing fees which he has no means of 
disputing; and he is faced with charges which he contends are not 
arrived at on any settled basis.” The Royal Commissioner declared 
                                                     
2 In the cinematic trade press, the President of the Showmen’s Association urged 
exhibitors to “embrace” the two year agreement with APRA, “as there is no doubt 
that I have effected a favourable settlement, and it must be recognised that [APRA] 
is in a position to impose higher charges on isolated showmen who refuse to 
subscribe to the general scheme.” 
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himself “satisfied” that “the exhibitors only agreed to the Australasian 
Performing Right Association’s terms under pressure”. 
The unhappiness of cinema owners pointed to a weakness in collective 
rights administration mentioned repeatedly in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Valuation methods were arbitrary and the absence of any qualifications 
to the performing right delivered almost total bargaining power to 
APRA. Additionally, as the cinema exhibitors could demonstrate,  
while APRA quickly spotted opportunities for demanding performing 
right fees, it would not discount fees to allow for reductions in  
music performances.  
In 1926 nearly all films screened were silent. The average performance 
by the orchestras playing accompaniment to screenings in city and 
suburban theatres lasted two and half to three hours, and about 40 to 
50 items of music were played during each performance. The 1926 
agreement negotiated by the Showmen’s Association provided for 
separate scales of rates for city cinemas and suburban and country 
cinemas, but it did not allow discounts for low attendance, or if a 
cinema ran at a loss. City venues paid 45s per 100 seats per annum, 
rising to 90s per annum if average weekly gross takings exceeded 
£1000. The suburban and country theatres paid a maximum of 25s per 
100 seats annually and a minimum fee of £1 5s per annum. 
The new agreement introduced by APRA in 1928 maintained the 1926 
tariff levels for existing and conforming subscribers but increased rates 
for those theatres said to have breached the 1926 agreement or which 
had commenced business after the 1926 agreement. Concessions were 
withdrawn. The new agreement made no allowance for the change in 
music performance patterns that followed the advent, after 1926, of 
sound pictures. 
Inequity of APRA’s rates 
The Royal Commission on Performing Rights carefully described the 
meaning of this omission for all cinema exhibitors, who continued to 
pay the rates set in 1926 or 1928, even though the quantity of music 
performed in cinemas after the introduction of talkies now dropped 
precipitately. After 1926, when sound pictures replaced silents, theatre 
proprietors began to realise they had little need to supply extraneous 
music. By 1932, orchestras had vanished from suburban theatres. In 
many, gramophone records were sometimes played briefly but in most 
instances the only music heard came from the soundtrack of the film. 
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The Commission report pointed out the inflexibility and inequity of 
APRA’s pricing schedule. It found that in 1926, a theatre of 1500 seats 
played an average of 50 music pieces per week compared with eight 
pieces per week in 1932. The theatre in 1926 gave 312 musical 
performances during the year, with performers playing an aggregate of 
936 hours of music. In 1932, the theatre gave the same number of 
performances but performances lasted for an aggregate of 156 hours. 
In 1926, the theatre used 2600 pieces of music and in 1932, 416.  
Although the performers it hired played much less music, and far less 
variety of music, occupying, in 1932, only one sixth the amount of time 
their predecessors spent in performance six years earlier, the theatre 
paid APRA the same annual amount, £18 15s, for the performance 
right. A similar theatre paying under the 1928 tariff would be liable to 
pay APRA £28 per annum. Not surprisingly, considering the popularity 
of cinema, APRA’s annual takings from picture theatres continued to 
rise steadily, from £7,622 in 1927 to £9,989 in 1931. 
J C Langley, the Secretary of the Cinematograph Exhibitors’ 
Association, noted in a 1932 letter to the Postmaster-General that by 
1930, cinemas played an average of 30 minutes recorded music per 
performance, yet APRA continued to charge them for the performance 
of three hours of live orchestral music. The Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights, sitting in the midst of the Great Depression, 
listened sympathetically to exhibitor complaints about heavy imposts in 
a time of straitened circumstances. 
Few observers understood APRA’s determination to apply to the 
talkies tariffs determined when orchestras performed music before, 
during and after the playing of silent films. The Commission also heard 
exhibitors express their unhappiness at the difficulties of paying APRA 
performance fees for the music contained in the soundtracks of films 
and decided that a licence to use APRA’s entire repertoire for a 
reasonable annual fee “under reasonable conditions” would removed 
“many of the difficulties now experienced by exhibitors”.  
A draft bill for a copyright tribunal and international 
protests 
To resolve their difficulties, the cinema exhibitors proposed to the 
Royal Commission the formation of a tribunal to allow the parties to 
reach reasonable terms and to review lists of APRA’s charges. As long 
ago as 1926, they made a similar suggestion to Walter Marks, who 
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passed to Latham a suggested compulsory arbitration provision drafted 
by the lawyer for the Showmen’s Association. Latham took the 
exhibitors’ concerns seriously and his department modelled a draft 
amending bill on the draft provision supplied by Marks.  
The draft bill never reached Parliament, but it signalled the seriousness 
with which the Attorney, even at the outset of controversy, regarded 
disputes over the performing right. The draft bill gave Latham useful 
leverage with APRA. In 1929, he requested confidential financial 
information from the collecting society and advised, incidentally, that 
the Government would, in the next Parliamentary session, give priority 
to considering a copyright amending bill. APRA responded within three 
days, disclosing detailed financial information, and anxiously asking that 
a company delegation could address Cabinet on the subject of the 
performing right. 
Neither Latham, as his departmental memorandums showed, nor his 
parliamentary colleagues, were ready to reach firm conclusions about 
regulating performing rights until an official inquiry could fully consider 
the consequences of APRA’s irruption into the landscape of music use. 
In the meantime, opposition to APRA’s tactic of sending letters of 
demand containing the threat of legal proceedings if music users did 
not agree to pay specified copyright licence fees grew into furious 
protests within two years of APRA emerging. Similar patterns of 
protest emerged also in Canada and South Africa.  
In Canada, the Motion Pictures Distributors and Exhibitors of Canada 
instructed cinema owners not to take out licences with the Canadian 
Performing Right Society, and invited the PRS to join in a test case to 
determine whether it could validly impose and collect licence fees. The 
PRS declined the invitation. The Government proved more 
forthcoming: it withdrew provisions in amending legislation that 
confirmed the right of the PRS to function as a collecting society.  
John Cooper, the President of the Canadian distributors’ association 
said in correspondence to his British counterpart in May 1926, that 
cinema owners in the dominions “would be quite prepared to pay 
copyright fees to local owners of copyright and local composers but 
they do not feel justified in paying fees to British or foreign composers 
and copyright holders.” The fee, he said, should be moderate and paid 
for a purpose. “We can quite see,” he wrote, “where a reasonable fee to 
encourage domestic production of music might be justifiable but we are 
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not clear that we are under obligation to pay toll to copyright holders 
and composers who live outside our countries.”  
Response of local government 
Domineering in its attitude towards the cinema exhibitors, APRA 
encountered in the responses of local government depths of 
antagonism it could scarcely have guessed. From the start, municipal 
councils, which controlled public halls across Australia, doubted 
APRA’s declarations of fidelity to the interests of music composers and 
openly declared it the income-maximising agent of publishing houses. 
In February 1927, the Local Government Association of NSW issued a 
circular titled The Copyright Levy – Should Public Bodies be Forced to Pay, and 
declared APRA a “combine” of publishers. This combine, said the 
LGA, subverted the law: 
It is apparently only within recent years that some enterprising genius discovered 
what a money-maker the Copyright Act would be if were only worked in the right 
way. As a matter of practice, the author does not publish musical works himself, but 
arranges for their publication by a music house, to which he sells the copyright either 
for a lump sum or a royalty. These music houses, being comprised of business firms, 
are naturally anxious to extract every possible penny of revenue from the works they 
are selling. 
In 1926, APRA sent the owners of public halls and similar places of 
entertainment a circular notice which included a form of licence and a 
demand for an annual licence fee of £3 15s for the public performance 
of music. The Secretary of the LGA wrote to Latham asking for 
protection against “threatening letters of this nature” and the wrongful 
“use” of the “quasi criminal procedure of the Copyright Act.” He asked 
the Attorney to “take some action that would protect the public against 
such a use of the Copyright Act”. In the same period, a number of 
federal parliamentarians lobbied by art schools, memorial associations 
and other institutions began to press Latham to curtail APRA, 
preferably by disqualifying legislation. 
Latham’s pro forma response expressed the Government’s unchanging 
position: 
The owner of the performing right of a musical composition has the exclusive right to 
perform the composition in public, or to authorize its performance in public. 
Accordingly any person who wishes to perform in public music in which a performing 
right exists can do so only with the consent of the owner of the performing right.  
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Latham’s letter directed the reader’s attention to section 15 of the 
Copyright Act, which imposed liability for copyright infringement on 
any person who, without authorisation of the owner, “for private 
profit” permitted a “theatre or other place of entertainment” to be used 
for the public performance of musical works. The provision did not 
apply, as Latham pointed out, if a person “was not aware, and had no 
reasonable ground for suspecting, that the performance would be an 
infringement.”  
The letter concluded that while unlicensed public performances of 
music infringed copyright, the liability of a hall owner for unlicensed 
public performances depended on the owner’s “degree of control” over 
a performance. Each “particular case would have to receive 
consideration on its merits.” The question of degree of control loomed 
large in the coming debates between APRA and the owners of 
entertainment venues, but it was a another proposition in Latham’s 
letter that pointed, unwittingly, to the real issue raised by APRA’s 
activities: “the terms upon which the musical composition can be 
performed in public are left to be determined by agreement between 
the parties.” 
APRA’s conduct 
Although Latham upheld APRA’s right, as assignee of musical 
copyrights, to prohibit unlicensed performances, he soon became 
interested in examining APRA’s conduct. This change of emphasis 
resulted from receiving continued protests about the organisation’s 
behaviour. Exposed to the continuing controversies that attended 
APRA’s aggressive licensing drives, Latham realised that he could not 
fairly maintain that the contending parties should be left alone to 
negotiate licensing terms. 
Supported by legislation, unchallenged as the single representative of 
the vast majority of owners, APRA was, as its opponents claimed, a 
fearsome commercial “combine” that could mow down any resistance 
in the courts. Without government intervention, the halls owners and 
entertainment venue proprietors, the most importuning of the music 
users, would eventually have to accept whatever terms APRA imposed. 
Latham, a coldly intelligent and detached individual, later the Chief 
Justice of the High Court, decided that he would have to do more than 
blandly defend APRA’s legal position. 
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He started pressing APRA about its methods. In a letter sent in May 
1927, he informed APRA’s Secretary that “your Association has no 
legal right to compel owners of halls to take licences from you; 
although this method of securing remuneration for owners of copyright 
may be convenient to your Association.” He went on to say that the 
“terms and the general tone of communications sent by your 
Association to owners of halls have been unfortunate, inasmuch as they 
have not unnaturally suggested to the persons receiving them that you 
claimed a right to levy halls as such.” 
Latham did more than emphasise that APRA wrongly implied that hall 
owners could not refuse a licence (and choose either to infringe 
copyright or to ban musical performances). The language of his letter 
implied that he accepted the most serious charge levelled at the 
collecting society, that of profiteering. “It would also seem,” he said, 
“from letters that I have received, that in some cases the payment 
demanded has been reasonably complained of as excessive.”  
Forensically precise about applying the law and adducing evidence, he 
was testy with APRA’s opponents whenever he detected exaggeration 
or special pleading in their arguments. He appeared impartial, though 
he intimated a belief that legislation might be needed to place some 
restriction on APRA’s bargaining power: 
I am not prepared to express any opinion upon the legal position or upon what may 
be regarded as the merits in any particular case. Consideration will be given to any 
definite proposals which may be made for an alteration of the law.  
Protest of local government – “The Copyright Levy” 
Neither APRA nor the federal Government could not afford to ignore 
the groundswell of protest generated by local government. The NSW 
LGA’s circular The Copyright Levy rapidly gained nationwide 
prominence. 44 local councils sent the circular to 30 federal politicians. 
They also communicated directly with Latham protesting APRA’s fees. 
From February 1927, copies of the circular made their way across the 
country forcing APRA, then in negotiation with the Roads Boards 
Association of WA – the owner of entertainment venues throughout 
the State – to explain to the Board that the circular’s “violent 
description of our activities” was “utterly at variance with the facts”.  
The circular began melodramatically in the style of the opening 
sentence of The Communist Manifesto, warning of a hovering menace 
about to threaten the settled conditions of daily life:  
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A combine has been formed in Australia which controls the selling and performing 
of practically all the saleable music which has been composed throughout the world in 
the past fifty years. 
The circular listed the current and proposed exactions imposed by 
APRA, stating that, “under the law, this combine has the power to 
enforce most of its demands.” APRA, according to the author,3 could 
only be resisted by concerted and determined action. “To say,” he 
wrote, “that this body is aggressive is to describe it mildly.” APRA had 
tried “to frighten” prospective licensees and “has issued many threats 
of prosecution and has officials patrolling Australia, threatening the 
owners of public halls with penalties.”  
APRA’s tactics included undertaking equitable actions which involved 
legal costs that few hall owners could countenance. “As part of a policy 
of threatening and frightening,” said the circular, “there is no doubt 
that the cost of an equity suit is a valuable weapon.” The circular 
proposed a plan of action: 
We think it is only right that the law should be altered, and the purpose of sending 
you this pamphlet is to ask your co-operation in securing an alteration of the law so 
as to protect the public and public institutions against threats and levies of this huge 
and wealthy combine. 
The circular did not mention Latham’s observation, in his pro forma 
correspondence of a few months before, that the liability of a hall 
owner for infringing public performances depended on the degree of 
control which the owner exercised over a performance in a hall.4 
Instead, it reported, not altogether accurately, that APRA “would 
secure a conviction if it could show that the hall-owner knew that at the 
dance some particular piece of music was to be played, that it was 
copyright, and that he, nevertheless, let the hall.”  
The circular pointed to the noticeable effect of organised resistance on 
APRA strategy of demanding high fees. Encountering resistance, 
APRA dropped its fees. The circular stated that: “the hall owners 
appear to be the only section of the public successful in resisting the 
                                                     
3 A Bluett, solicitor and Secretary of the Local Government Association of NSW. 
4 In Corporation of the City of Adelaide v Australasian Performing Right Association (1928), 
the High Court held that a hall owner could not be said to have given permission 
for a public performance in the hall even though the owner had been informed an 
infringement would occur and could have prevented infringement by terminating 
the hall rental contract. In December 1928, the Privy Council dismissed APRA’s 
application for leave to appeal the High Court’s decision. 
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demands of the A.P.R.A. … Finding little response to their earlier 
threats, they subsequently made a number of reduced offers. On  
one occasion as little as 5/- per hall per annum was offered to the 
friendly societies …”5 
Above all, APRA could in theory increase its fees ad infinitum, “there 
being, of course, no legal limit to the amount that can be demanded.” 
APRA possessed an absolute right. Nothing in the copyright legislation 
prevented it from wielding the performing right as an instrument of 
oppression. APRA, said the circular, “apparently intends to comb the 
country with a fine-tooth comb so that no hall, however small or 
remote will escape from paying its yearly fee.”6 Given such power, why 
would APRA not exert it to maximum commercial advantage? “There 
can,” the circular said, “be little quarrel with the A.P.R.A. as a business 
organization squeezing out of the public all it can possibly exact.”  
These observations led directly to a query raised again and again over 
several years by the various opponents of APRA. Did the framers of 
copyright legislation intend the law to function to allow taxation by 
private collectives? In the words of the circular, the “question for the 
public to settle is whether the law as it stands is a fair one and whether 
the framers of it ever had in mind the creation of such an organisation 
for the exploitation of copyright.” Nearly every individual or 
organisation that wrestled with APRA over the payment of performing 
right fees would admit only one answer: the 19th century legislators 
invented the public performance right to allow composers to secure 
much needed income, and their 20th century successors never intended 
it to be used as a tool for unjust enrichment. 
In the emotionally charged atmosphere of the late 1920s, APRA’s 
antagonists could find nothing to commend its activities, not even its 
function as a vehicle for remunerating authors. They conjured the 
image of a pristine Australian commercial scene pastoral in its peaceful 
predictability. Against an imagined background of snow white purity 
APRA stood out like a black wolf, a hovering menace descending from 
the wintry skyline to savage the sheep below. Certainly, opponents 
wanted to see composers rewarded for their work. But APRA the 
ravening wolf served one master, the publishers:  
                                                     
5 The circular observed that it was “hard to say on what basis” APRA determined 
fees. “Apparently,” it noted, “up to £7/7/- per annum was the figure originally 
favoured.” 
6 The circular made a “conservative” estimate of 5000 halls in Australia. 
 
148 
No-one wants to deprive the Australian musician of the fullest possible reward for 
his genius. It would appear, however, that very little of the huge amount paid by the 
public in the way of copyright goes to the benefit of Australian composers. It is a 
question for consideration whether, if the public is to pay these huge sums, the matter 
should not be under Government control, in order to ensure that Australian artists 
get their full return. The Copyright Act was intended to benefit artists and 
composers. Under the present system of organisation, the music combine gets most of 
the benefit. 
The LGA’s circular proceeded to expose APRA’s assumed motives. At 
a government-sponsored conference of music users and APRA,7 said 
its author, the LGA proposed that Parliament investigate ways to 
regulate the performing right. An APRA representative reportedly 
described this suggestion “as the most immoral proposition he had ever 
heard”. The circular ended with a call to arms, asking the owners of 
halls and other entertainment venues to contact their local members 
and press for parliamentary investigation of APRA’s activities. “The 
combine,” was already “getting firmly entrenched” and hall proprietors 
were entitled “to ask that the charges [of APRA] should be properly 
regulated and not left to this method of collection by threat.” 
“Legalised bushranging” 
The LGA circular electrified its audience, prompting a torrent of 
protest letters to Parliament and galvanising local government officials. 
Within days, the Evening News in Sydney reported Alderman Jackett of 
Burwood Council saying that APRA “will make a demand upon the 
churches to pay a licence fee for the hymns they sing.” In April 1927, 
The Sun quoted a letter from the Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce, read at 
a meeting of Newtown Council. Bruce declared that: 
The whole question of copyright law is an extraordinarily difficult and complex one, 
because of the number of international conferences with regard to copyright. The 
matter could not be dealt with by an alteration of the law without possibly very 
serious results to Australian citizens who desire copyright privileges in  
other countries. 
Alderman Turtle summed up the feelings of Newtown’s Councillors. 
The activities of APRA were, he said, “legalised bushranging”. 
                                                     
7 Presumably one in a series of conferences organised by the Postmaster General’s 
Department in July and August 1926.  
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The Roads Boards Association of WA also accepted the arguments in 
the circular. Although Roads Boards representatives met their APRA 
counterparts over several months and the two organisations 
corresponded over a dozen times, the West Australians asked the 
federal member for Dampier, Henry Gregory, to press Latham for a 
Royal Commission to investigate APRA. Gregory had already written 
to Bruce, asking for the appointment of a Royal Commission to 
investigate the need for changes to copyright legislation. Developments 
in broadcasting and cinema, and the establishment of APRA, he told 
Bruce, demanded a Government response. 
He repeated his request to Latham, asking for “full enquiry into the 
demands and legal rights of the Performing Rights Association” and 
noting the “very strong impression that exploitation would not be too 
strong a term to use in regard to the demands made by this 
Association.” Latham passed the correspondence to APRA for 
comment. He informed Gregory that questions about APRA “have 
been similarly raised with countries on the other side of the world, and 
apparently the difficulties there have been adjusted with a reasonable 
degree of satisfaction to those concerned.” 
The Government, he said, was not going to abolish the performing 
right as to do so would make Australia a “pirate nation in Copyright 
Law”. However, he assured Gregory, the Government wanted to 
establish a system for determining fair remuneration and distribution. 
Latham did not underestimate the difficulties ahead:  
I have not been able to obtain from any source any suggestion for a reasonable system 
of assessing payments and securing that they should go to the author, but I have put 
the matter very plainly to the Performing Rights Association, and I hope that the 
difficulties will be surmounted. 
If Latham thought he could avoid giving the performing right 
controversy his total attention, events soon disabused him. The Roads 
Boards of WA wrote to all West Australian federal parliamentarians 
asking them to support Gregory, and in August 1927, Latham duly 
received a stream of mail requesting that he investigate APRA. He 
responded by asking Garran to send Gregory copies of APRA’s 
correspondence with the Roads Boards, the Local Authorities 
Association of Queensland, and Canon Garland of Brisbane.  
APRA had informed Garran that the letters copied “demonstrate the 
moderate, even conciliatory, attitude which is adopted in our 
correspondence” but Gregory was not impressed. He acknowledged 
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that APRA “have behaved with the greatest courtesy” but he noted that 
the letters “do not afford much insight into the general question.” 
Gregory repeated the proposition that Latham would eventually act on, 
five years later: 
I still think that some action should be taken by the Government with a view of 
considering what amendments might be made to the Copyright Act and also whether 
any action should be taken under the same Act so as to afford protection to the 
general public against any unjust or unfair demands that may be made. 
APRA responds and LGA proposes withdrawal from 
Berne Convention 
By the time of Gregory’s final letter in September 1927, APRA’s 
dispute with the proprietors of public halls and entertainment venues 
had flared into open warfare across Australia. APRA blamed the 
nation’s local government associations. R Nathan, APRA’s Chairman, 
informed Garran in a long letter in July that the “opposition on the part 
of Local Government authorities has left us the alternative of 
addressing ourselves directly to the promoters of entertainment in their 
public halls.”  
APRA intended, he said, to “carry out its business … in a dignified and 
equitable manner” even though the “criticism and hostility”  
of its opponents were “clearly based on misunderstanding and 
ignorance”. However, he warned, its “conciliatory attitude” should not 
be interpreted “as a sign of weakness”. In early September, the NSW 
LGA wrote again to Latham, responding to Latham’s request, earlier  
in the year, for the disputing parties to submit legislative proposals for 
his consideration.  
The LGA’s Executive asked the Government to declare APRA illegal 
as a “combine”, to impose costs liability on APRA in enforcement 
actions if damages awarded were less than £50, and to require APRA to 
publicly disclose details of revenue and distributions. The 
correspondence went further. The LGA proposed that Australia 
withdraw from the Berne Convention.8 By doing so, declared the letter, 
the Government would free itself from the Convention’s implied 
prohibition against placing limitations on the performing right. It could 
enact suitable restrictions – including the outlawing of APRA – and 
                                                     
8 Australia was not yet an independent member of the Berne Convention. It 
accepted the obligations of the treaty as a British possession and became a member 
in its own right the following year in April 1928. 
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thereby ensure that Australian composers, rather than a publishers’ 
“combine”, benefited from the performing right. Latham refused this 
suggestion but the LGA’s proposal left him in no doubt about the 
alarm and hostility aroused in music users by APRA’s control of the 
performing right.  
In placing Australian interest at the forefront of the argument, the LGA 
repeated arguments made in the parliamentary debates over import 
controls in 1912. The Association asked whether domestic laws made 
in accordance with international treaty benefited the national economic 
interest. The LGA thought not, at least in the case of the performing 
right. Collections for public performance in Australia hardly benefited 
Australians and if fees remitted overseas, mostly to Britain, were 
unlikely to much benefit British composers:  
An examination of any of the lists sent out by the A.P.R.A. would make it appear 
that the Australian music market has been almost entirely captured by foreign 
music. It is doubtful out of every £100 the public contribute in payment for 
copyright as much as £1 goes to Australian composers.9 
Several parliamentarians, including the Postmaster General, also 
forwarded copies of the LGA’s correspondence to Latham, but he was 
unmoved. He replied to them all that he had no intention of 
recommending that Australia withdraw from the Berne Convention. As 
he well knew, and his correspondents evidently did not, the Convention 
by now exercised powerful moral suasion in many parts of the world. 
To repudiate it would be seen, to borrow the type of language that 
copyright proponents were apt to use, as a declaration of barbarism. 
The Brisbane Memorial Statement 
In the meantime, APRA battled the Local Government Authority of 
Queensland, which in October 1927 published the Brisbane Memorial 
Statement attacking the collecting society. The Queensland Government 
endorsed the statement, sending it to Bruce asking him to forward a 
copy to Sir William Harrison Moore, Australia’s newly appointed 
delegate to the looming Rome Conference of the Berne Union. 
                                                     
9 If the Government implemented its suggestions, the LGA said, Australia, like the 
United States, could “take charge of her own copyright affairs” and “make it a 
condition that nothing shall be copyrighted in Australia until it has been printed in 
Australia.” 
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APRA’s executive reacted furiously, and the Association fired a letter to 
the State’s Premier, declaring that, “we would have thought that you 
would have given us an opportunity of stating our case before 
supporting an amendment of the Copyright Act.” The letter enclosed a 
paragraph by paragraph statement of rebuttal of the Brisbane 
Memorial. The reader could not mistake the palpable tone of outrage in 
the letter. One paragraph in particular seemed to express the pent-up 
feelings held in during eight months of sometimes bitter attack: 
We feel sure after perusal of same [the rebuttal statement] that the undeserved, 
untrue, and unmerited accusations launched against our Association would not have 
been supported by you or your Government had you been in possession of these facts, 
nor would you have been a party to the dissemination in places outside of Australia, 
of such slanderous statements impeaching the bona fides of an Australian 
corporation composed of Business men of unimpeachable integrity. 
The Brisbane Memorial enumerated 18 reasons why APRA should not 
be allowed to collect fees for public performance. A couple of the 
points raised remain controversial in the modern era: APRA, said the 
Memorial, did not reveal to whom money collected was distributed, and 
it did not clearly establish its title to works. Other objections continue 
to press against modern orthodoxy on the merits of performing rights.  
One objection stated that the original copyright legislators did not 
intend that performance right, if asserted, should be exercised in 
relation to new technologies like broadcasting. Another claimed that 
the benefits to the copyright owner of public performances ought to be 
taken into account when assessing fees, and a third suggested that 
APRA set fees arbitrarily. APRA responded to all criticisms in detail 
but it is hard to say how much its efforts influenced Latham.  
On most points he would have agreed with the collecting society 
anyway. On the key questions of transparency and arbitrariness, 
however, he might not. Latham had already communicated to the 
Solicitor General his concern at the latitude the Copyright Act gave 
APRA to set fees. Very slowly, as the protests continued, he inched his 
way towards acceptance of the call for a royal commission.  
Moving forward 
Over the next two years, events mimicked Latham’s slow progress. The 
different commercial users of music continued their resistance to 
APRA’s claims for payment, though increasingly they stopped agitating 
for APRA to be declared illegal and concentrated on highlighting the 
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perceived unreasonableness of performance fees. As the war over fees 
dragged on, APRA’s right to enforce the performing right became 
more accepted and the organisation continued doggedly to pursue 
claims for payment. It won copyright infringement suits against 
councils that allowed unlicensed performances of music in public halls, 
and in March 1929 secured, in a test case against Radio 3DB in Sydney, 
an injunction restraining the unlicensed broadcasting of music. 
Politicians continued to ask questions. The Chamber of Agricultural 
Societies of Queensland, lobbied by various constituent societies, 
protested to Colonel Donald Cameron, the MP for Brisbane, about 
APRA’s exactions. He, in May 1929, asked Latham if, “some relief may 
be possible, though perhaps it may mean amendment of the Copyright 
Act of 1912.” Latham responded equivocally. He pointed out APRA’s 
right to restrain the public performance of music, and suggested that 
the Government might adopt the Royal Commission on Wireless’s 
proposal that A Class stations pay APRA 5 per cent of annual revenue. 
Latham more clearly indicated his intentions by informing APRA – in a 
letter requesting financial information on Cameron’s behalf – that the 
Government intended to give urgent attention to a bill to amend the 
Copyright Act. He did not disclose the contents of the bill – which 
contained the forerunner of the voluntary arbitration provision that 
would eventually be enacted in 1933 – but there is no reason to doubt 
the sincerity of his professed intentions. 
APRA responded with alarm, and in July 1929, having received no 
response to a request to address Cabinet on the bill, wrote to Latham 
protesting a Country Party resolution “suggesting alterations to 
Copyright Law of a revolutionary character”. The Secretary N Edwards 
asked for “an official statement to be made in the House when 
Copyright Law is debated, to the effect that the Government has 
thoroughly satisfied itself on the bona fides of this Association and that 
in fact it establishes a very convenient situation to those who desire to 
perform copyright music at public entertainments.” 
Latham responded bluntly that he was not prepared to undertake to 
make the requested statement. Instead he asked APRA to supply a 
schedule of public hall licence fees. Latham considered that the size of 
public performance fees demanded lay at the heart of users’ 
unhappiness with APRA. Reduce fees, he thought, and the problem of 
the performing right would disappear. He was only partly correct. 
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Fewer protests might be heard from the hall owners but the radio 
broadcasters and cinema exhibitors, by far APRA’s greatest sources of 
revenue, were quietly waiting for the opportunity to expose to a public 
inquiry what they considered the evil effect of APRA’s monopoly. They 
hoped that APRA might somehow be forced from the scene. 
The opportunity, however, did not come as they hoped. In October 
1929, the Government’s backbench revolted over Bruce’s attempt to 
dismantle the federal arbitration system, forcing a national election. 17 
days before the Wall Street stockmarket collapse, Labor drove the 
Nationalist-Country Party coalition from office, and for two years, 
Latham’s copyright bill gathered dust in a drawer. 
The Rome Conference 1928 
Broadcasting and performance 
Controversies centred on the musical performing right occupied the 
attention of Australian copyright policymakers from the mid 1920s 
until the outbreak of World War II. Though the battles over the 
performing right overshadowed other developments in copyright law, 
the period should be remembered also for the successful efforts of the 
broadcasting and recording industries to influence copyright policy.  
In 1928, the Berne Union met in Rome to discuss amendments to the 
Berne Convention. A principal proposal involved recognition of the 
copyright author’s right to control the broadcasting of copyright works. 
Preparatory papers circulated by the Italian organisers of the Rome 
Conference left no doubt of the Union’s intentions and Australian 
radio broadcasters, already alarmed by APRA’s demands for 
performance fees, became doubly concerned that the Union’s 
recognition of an unqualified broadcasting right would set in stone  
the absolute right conferred on APRA by section 2 of the British  
Copyright Act.  
Thus empowered, APRA could continue to demand whatever fees it 
wished for the broadcasting of music. Broadcasters, working with their 
British counterparts, set in train a resistance strategy that they hoped 
would result in the Berne Union accepting the principle that 
governments could legislate to qualify the broadcasting right. For their 
part, the record manufacturers tried, and failed, to secure international 
recognition of a manufacturers’ performing right in records. But they 
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did not give up and in the 1930s the common law (in Britain) 
recognised a right that, until then, policy makers devoutly disclaimed.  
Official preparation for the Rome Conference began in earnest in the 
middle of 1927. In May, the Commonwealth Attorney General’s 
Department sent letters to main protagonists in the performing right 
saga advising that Professor William Harrison Moore would represent 
Australia, and welcoming “any practical suggestions which may assist 
the Conference in its task”. The next month, replying to a politician’s 
letter of complaint about APRA, Latham explained that his attention 
was fixed on international matters: “I am engaged,” he wrote, “upon 
this subject and other aspects of the Copyright Law in connection with 
the agenda of the [Rome] Conference.” 
Role of Australia and New Zealand 
The Rome Conference, held at the Palazzo Corsini, opened on 7 May 
1928 and continued until 2 June. Delegates from 69 countries took part 
in the proceedings, 39 of which were members the Berne Union and 39 
non-members. In the months preceding the Conference, the Italian 
delegates to the Conference, and the Berne Secretariat distributed to 
Union members proposals for amendment of the Convention.  
Subcommittees discussed the proposals but the member delegates 
sitting in whole committee performed most of the work of the 
Conference. A Commission de Rédaction (drafting committee) 
performed the tasks of drafting and revision leading to the publication 
of the summary of proceedings, the Rapport Général. From the start, 
Australia and New Zealand played a vital role in proceedings, pressing 
the reluctant civil law nations to agree to allowing Union members to 
place restrictions on the broadcasting right. The civil law nations led by 
France, the supreme advocate of untrammelled authors’ rights, no 
doubt looked askance at the antipodean upstarts. New Zealand became 
a member of the Berne Union10 in 1927 and Australia in April 1928.  
Although independent members, they aligned themselves closely with 
the British, Canadian and Indian delegations, the five working together 
as a bloc. According to Moore’s report to Parliament, the group’s 
“discussions were invaluable to the delegates themselves, and in my 
                                                     
10 Commonly referred to in the official literature of the day as the International 
Copyright Union. 
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opinion very materially facilitated the work of the Conference.” 11 The 
delegates, bound by the Convention’s proviso that members could alter 
its provisions only by unanimous consent, displayed what Moore called 
a “certain spirit of accommodation”, trying hard for compromise 
whenever they reached impasse. 
The Conference’s final Rapport Général listed seven text amendments, 
the most important and controversial of which protected moral rights 
and recognised the author’s right to authorise the radio broadcasting of 
a work, subject to the power of national legislatures to control the 
exercise of the right. The British bloc, and especially Australia and New 
Zealand, assisted by Norway, played a leading role in the debates over 
both categories of rights. The “British delegations’, as Moore called 
them, opposed the proposed moral rights amendment before accepting 
a revised version.  
They played the primary role, amidst furious opposition led by the 
French delegates, in securing agreement to a proviso that allowed 
nations to limit the absolute right of authors to control the 
broadcasting of works. In the subcommittee on mechanical 
reproduction rights, the British bloc also raised the possibility of 
recognising either a mechanical performing right, or, to protect record 
purchasers, some limitation on the author’s performing right. The 
proposals aimed to ensure that record companies could not be forced 
to pay performance fees. For most delegates, who came to Rome 
expecting to participate in the elaboration of authors’ rights, the idea of 
recognising mechanical rights proved too much.  
But the attitude of the “British delegations” is revealing. For them, it 
seemed, the interests of industries mattered as much as those of 
authors, and they seemed also to believe that the law must 
pragmatically reflect the bargains struck by opposed interest groups and 
their mediators – politicians. The French, peddling the impossible idea 
of a copyright system that allowed authors to absolutely control the 
production of copyright material, were horrified.  
The antipodean consensus 
The British attitude is more accurately described as the antipodean 
consensus. Months before the Rome Conference began, Moore and his 
New Zealand counterpart, the King’s Counsel, Samuel George 
                                                     
11 Report of the Australian Delegate (International Copyright Conference, Rome), presented to 
the Commonwealth Parliament in August 1928. 
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Raymond, resolved to make sure that delegates heard in full the 
concerns of radio broadcasters and gramophone companies. They 
listened openly to the views expressed by the industries. On two 
consecutive days in Berne in October 1927, they met representatives of 
the Committee of the Mechanical Music Industry (UK) and the 
Columbia Gramophone Company.  
Recently appointed as Australia’s delegate to the League of Nations, a 
position he held till 1930, Moore provided the Government with a clear  
account of the meeting and assured the industry representatives that he 
would give “careful consideration” to their views. The gramophone 
company representatives asked Moore and Raymond to support three 
principles: a universal statutory recording licence, compulsory 
registration of full details of a recording, and a public performance right 
in records.12  
Moore politely warned the gramophone company representatives that 
most of his colleagues at the Rome Conference were likely to greet each 
of the industry’s proposals with disgust. He followed the arguments for 
a mechanical performing right with interest, and discovered that the 
gramophone industry did not intend to use the right to claim revenue. 
According to Wood and Shields, the industry’s envoys, record 
companies wanted to protect the purchasers of their recordings from 
claims for payment for exercising the author’s performing right.  
In their view, a mechanical performing right neutralised the author’s 
performing right, preventing copyright owners from demanding that 
record companies pay performance fees for each record produced. 
Moore reported to the Government that he saw at once that the 
gramophone companies’ proposal would be rejected. He suggested to 
Woods and Shield that they forget about a mechanical performing 
right, and instead let him ask the Union for “a provision that every 
record should carry the right of public performance without fee.” 
Woods and Shields readily agreed. In the end, Moore does not seem to 
have made his request. The “British delegation” asked Rome 
Conference delegates to consider an unqualified mechanical performing 
right, but no proposals benefitting the gramophone industry met with 
favour at the Conference. Even so, a careful observer might have 
                                                     
12 Moore stated that the standard text Copinger on Copyright considered that the 
copyright of the first maker of a recording (i.e. the person authorised by the author 
to make a recording) included a public performance right.  
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detected a disturbance in the orderly process stage-managed by Italy, 
the host, and France, the champion of authors’ rights.  
Subterranean rumblings were shaking the seemingly secure foundations 
on which the Union built the edifice of authors’ rights. Before the 
delegates left Rome, the rumblings, thanks mainly to the efforts of 
Moore and Raymond, resulted in a minor earthquake. In succeeding 
years the meaning of the tumult became clearer. The proponents of 
authors’ rights were forced to abandon forever the conceit that authors’ 
rights could be advanced without reciprocal gains for industries. 
Qualification of the broadcasting right  
The earthquake involved the assertion of broadcaster prerogative. It 
resulted, without doubt, from the energy and determination of the 
antipodean delegates. Moore and Raymond were not shy about 
identifying their leading roles in securing the restriction sought by 
broadcasters. Their two Conference reports asserted that they were 
principally responsible for persuading delegates to eventually agree to 
the principle of jurisdictional limitation to the new broadcasting right.  
The General Report of the Conference concurred, admitting that the 
second paragraph of Article 11 bis (which recognised the author’s right 
to control the broadcasting of works) resulted from the efforts of the 
antipodean nations to bring the author’s exclusive right “under public 
control”. As Moore pointed out in his parliamentary report, the: 
Article as it now stands in the Convention is now described in the Rapport Général 
as a compromise between two opposing tendencies, with which the Rapport 
particularly associates the French and the Australian and New Zealand delegations 
respectively – the one for assimilating completely the right of broadcasting to the other 
exclusive rights of the author; the other for bringing the right under public control in 
view of the social and cultural interests involved. 
Raymond, a senior government lawyer, born and educated in country 
Victoria, said in his report that the President referred to Australia and 
New Zealand in the General Report as “the chief advocates of certain 
views.”13 Raymond also noted that the “entry of the Union by Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand introduced an entirely new element – an 
element putting forward views considered as little short of 
revolutionary by some older members of the Union.” 
                                                     
13 Report on the International Copyright Conference Rome 1928. 
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The successful advocacy by Australia and New Zealand of a position 
considered hostile to the ideals of the Berne Union demonstrated the 
impossibility of absolute commitment to the ideology of authors’ rights. 
No industry, in the common law countries at least, would countenance 
the concentration, in the hands of authors, of unlimited powers to 
restrict and tax industry’s use of copyright material. Antipodean 
intervention raised a new possibility previously not much on the mind 
of Union delegates.  
Perhaps, some delegates began to see, qualification of authors’ rights 
represented a public gain. Previously, Union ideologues, if they thought 
about the question at all, would have assumed that the interests of the 
public and authors were synonymous. How could intelligent people not 
recognise that limitless privileges granted to the creative interest would 
not bring their nation the reciprocal benefit of eternal civilisation? 
The new entrants to the Union thought differently. Both Moore and 
Raymond, coming from countries in the midst of bruising conflicts 
over APRA’s claims and methods,14 distinguished the public interest 
from the author’s interest, and claimed public benefit as the principal 
motivation for their efforts in Rome. According to Raymond, the 
Union should try to, “reconcile the just claims of the owners of 
copyright with the public interest”. He proudly stated that, “the 
interests of the public – that great body of purchasers and consumers 
of copyright wares – were vigorously voiced by the Dominions for the 
first time in the history of the International Copyright Conferences.”  
What is particularly interesting about the reports of Moore and 
Raymond is that both imply a criticism of the Berne Union made more 
openly in later years by others – that its elaborations in favour of 
authors were intellectually sterile if they did not recognise the needs of 
industries, and, most importantly, the public. Both boldly put forward 
their countries as embodiments of a newer, more vital spirit lacking in 
the European nations. Australia and New Zealand, they implied, were 
not hidebound by prejudice.  
Describing the necessity for restriction on the author’s absolute control 
of broadcasts of works, Moore said that in Australia and New Zealand, 
“the operation of the performing right was evidently felt as a grievance 
in a marked degree … the condition of new countries gave the matter a 
                                                     
14 As its name suggested, APRA also operated in New Zealand. 
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greater importance there as more deeply affecting their social life and 
therefore their culture and development.”15 Raymond was more direct.  
He declared that “a remote country such as New Zealand must, if it is 
to keep its place in the march of civilisation, be vigilant in keeping, so 
far as it can, the great discoveries of the radiophonic field free from 
domination by commercial and financial combines and associations.” 
Australia and New Zealand, “representing the public interests” were 
“unfettered by the overemphasized traditional respect for copyright-
holders’ rights, and unhampered by capitalistic interests, so powerful in 
the counsels of the Old World countries.” 
Raymond, more squarely than Moore, characterised the author as the 
greatest threat to the constructive growth of radio broadcasting in 
Australia and New Zealand. The two countries were, he said, 
“combating a world-wide association, having great capital revenues, and 
they succeeded by asserting the principle of home rule in radiophone 
control, and thus stemmed the tide of copyright uniformity.” Moore 
made clear, however, that he acted on clear instructions from his 
Government. “It was plain,” he wrote in his report, “that the 
Convention itself could not meet the varying conditions of different 
countries; all that was possible was to endeavour to secure for each 
country the power to regulate its own conditions; and my instructions 
were on these lines.” 
Position of Latham 
A year before the Conference, Latham received a 28 page report from 
G S Brown, the Registrar of Copyrights on “Proposals to be Submitted 
to the Rome Conference”. In it, Brown, a partisan for authors’ rights 
who strongly supported APRA in its licensing campaigns, denounced 
the pretensions, as he saw them, of the record manufacturers and 
broadcasters. “In no case,” he said, “should there be any admission of 
the prescriptive rights of broadcasting companies to copyright 
property.”  
The Attorney, however, made up his mind in favour of the 
broadcasters. Having, as senior counsel, assisted a music publisher to 
enforce its performing right against a radio station, it is not likely that 
he did so out of preference. Latham, despite his reputation for union-
                                                     
15 He added the comment that, “It was interesting to note that the countries nearest 
to these in feeling on the subject were countries such as Denmark and Norway, 
where rural interests predominate.” 
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bashing, favoured no-one. He grew up in a strict Methodist  
household and later became a strict rationalist. In political life he 
maintained an attitude of cold disinterestedness. Like all Australian 
politicians, he understood the benefits that wireless offered to a remote 
and sparsely habited continent. He would not permit foreigners to 
create a future which might allow APRA, if it chose, to bring 
broadcasters to their knees.  
Australia’s radio industry, diverse, fractious and vociferous, like that of 
the United States, resented curtailment and demanded commercial 
freedom. Broadcasters insisted that the copyright legislation, which they 
thought facilitated predatory commercial conduct, must be altered. In 
most countries of the Union, including Britain, State control of radio 
services through a national broadcaster produced an atmosphere of 
polite conformity that encouraged policymakers to view the activities of 
collecting societies like APRA with a friendliness not shared by their 
Australian counterparts.  
Latham, though frequently exasperated by the naïve importunities of 
APRA’s opponents – including requests for Australia to withdraw from 
the Berne Convention or abolish the performing right – looked  
coldly on APRA’s conduct. His support for Moore’s activism testified 
to his attitude.  
The argument with France 
Moore and Raymond, together with the delegates of Canada and 
Norway, partially supported by the British delegation, worked hard to 
secure agreement to their qualification to proposed Article 11 bis. They 
wielded a single weapon. The requirement for unanimous agreement to 
any alteration to the Convention meant that they could, by casting 
negative votes, defeat the proposal to grant the author control of 
broadcasting of works. The real possibility that they might do so, unless 
the other nations agreed to their proposals, now opened the eyes of the 
other Conference delegates. Awakened to the necessity for 
compromise, these delegates began to take the antipodeans seriously.  
The older members of the Union were astonished to find themselves in 
a tussle over the proposed Article 11 bis and even more amazed that 
two neophytes – Australia had been a member of the Union for one 
month – could assert their position in the teeth of opposition from the 
traditionalists led by France. For the delegates of the two countries,  
the task was fraught with effort and tension. As Moore said, the 
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proposals to reserve to national legislatures the “power to reconcile the 
exercise of the author’s rights with the public interest” started 
“innumerable” consultations and debates and led to proliferating drafts 
of proposed revisions.  
The “Latin countries”, according to Moore, argued that any reservation 
of the broadcasting right was unnecessary. They claimed that the 
Convention dealt with private rights and did not restrict public powers 
to control abuses. Those in favour of the reservation – Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, Britain and Norway – would not back down. Moore 
knew that broadcasters in Australia refused to accept accommodation 
and rejected the assurances of France and others. They sent a plain 
message: the Convention must explicitly qualify Article 11 bis.  
The civil law countries insisted on their position. A sinister precedent 
disturbed them. They remembered how in 1908 delegates gave way to 
the phonographic industry, and the soothing words of the Anglo 
Saxons – only to find that the licence helped the gramophone industry 
to grow rich while availing authors nothing. Remembering how much 
they regretted the compulsory licence, most delegates fell in behind the 
French, unwilling to accept any limitation on the author’s right to 
control broadcasts.  
Moore and Raymond did not give up. The argument over the 
restriction they proposed eventually came down to how a restriction to 
the broadcasting right might operate in practice. Australia and New 
Zealand insisted that legislatures should have the power to limit rights 
in the “public interest” (l’interêt public) but France would not accept a 
qualifying phrase that, if admitted, might be used to justify harm to the 
author’s interest. The French delegation instead proposed the term 
“public order” (l’ordre public), or more accurately, perhaps, “public 
administration”, which Moore and his colleague rejected as too narrow. 
Resolution 
Delegates now considered a new proposal that linked a right to limit 
authors’ rights to public interest considerations. The French agreed to 
the addition to Article 17 – which dealt with the power of governments 
to control the distribution of copyright works or products – of a clause 
permitting legislatures to authorise the restriction of rights by “such 
measures as might be considered justified by public requirements”. 
Frustratingly, the compromise failed. The Drafting Committee would 
 
163 
not accept the proposal. Delegates hoping for agreement on the 
broadcasting right grew desperate as the Conference neared its end.  
Moore and Raymond stayed steadfast in their refusal to agree to Article 
11 bis unless it contained a qualifying paragraph that would allow their 
governments to introduce legislative controls. “Finally,” said Moore, 
“as the proceedings drew to a close, any hope of modifying Article 11 
in the direction proposed by Australia and New Zealand had to be 
abandoned.” Failure of the antipodean amendment meant failure of the 
broadcasting article as whole, and the Italian delegation made a final 
attempt at compromise. To general relief, Moore and Raymond 
accepted their draft amendment.  
The paragraph agreed Article 11 bis (2) stated: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the 
conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be 
exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have 
been prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral 
rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in 
the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority. 
Neither Moore nor Raymond viewed the final draft of Article 11 bis 
with much enthusiasm. Moore said it was “in a form we could accept”. 
In his report, Raymond declared that, “[t]his article your delegate 
considers satisfactory.” Nonetheless, the two men could feel satisfied. 
They carried out their instructions and achieved their object.  
They also staved off a rumoured attempt to overturn the qualification 
in Article 13 that allowed legislatures to impose reservations and 
conditions on the author’s control of mechanical reproduction of 
works and the public performance of such reproductions. Removal of 
the reservation would mean that the compulsory licensing of sound 
recordings would be inconsistent with the Convention and the pair 
circulated a memorandum stating they would not consent to any 
proposal suggesting revision. No proposal came, and, having made the 
names of their countries unforgettable to their fellow delegates, Moore 
and Raymond packed their bags and left Rome. 
Moore and Raymond 
The results of the work of Moore and Raymond should not be 
underestimated. Without the intervention of Australia and New 
Zealand, assisted, according to Moore, by “other British delegations” 
 
164 
and “some of the Continental countries”,16 it is likely that Article 11 bis 
would have extended to the author unrestricted control over the 
broadcasting of works, and unleashed, at least in the Australian radio 
industry, an angry spirit of confrontation. 
Moore put the point soberly in his report. “It seemed to me,” he wrote, 
“particularly at this early stage in the development of broadcasting, 
when its possibilities were comparatively unknown, that it would be 
unwise to recognize rights in so absolute a manner as to embarrass 
their regulation and control in the public interest.” Aged in their 60s, 
Moore and Raymond were determined men at the end of distinguished 
legal careers, one a university professor, the other a Crown prosecutor. 
Their maturity and calm resolution allowed them to resist and defuse 
the sometimes hostile entreaties of other delegates. 
Without the active lobbying of Moore and Raymond, Britain would 
probably not have agreed to introduce the proposal to introduce a 
qualifying paragraph to Article 11 bis. Negotiating on behalf of the 
BBC, British government officials felt they could comfortably moderate 
the demands of the Performing Right Society, and consequently the 
British Government felt no discomfort in the idea of the author’s 
absolute right to control radio broadcasts of works. 
Particular credit perhaps also belonged to Moore. Sir William Harrison 
Moore, an Englishman, won the Chair of Law at Melbourne University 
in 1892 at the age of 25. A dainty, fastidious man, he specialised in 
constitutional law and greatly increased the prestige of the University’s 
law faculty. He taught constitutional and international law to the future 
consecutive Chief Justices, Latham and Sir Owen Dixon, and inspired 
them to take a broad intellectual view of the law’s possibilities. In 1927, 
Latham, a friend, secured his appointment as Australia’s delegate to the 
League of Nations, and in the following year, Moore participated in the 
Rome Conference.  
Punctilious, hard working, and not afraid of controversy, he proved the 
ideal person to carry out difficult instructions “to secure for each 
country the power to regulate its own conditions”. With courtesy  
and tact, no doubt, but also with unshakeable determination, he  
and Raymond engaged persistently with their dissenting colleagues.  
The pair walked into the whirlwind of reproach and emerged  
successful revolutionaries. 
                                                     
16 Norway and probably Denmark. 
 
165 
Key role of Australia and New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand, responding to the unique circumstances of 
their radio industries, were the agents of change and limitation at the 
Rome Conference. Much followed from the acceptance of revised 
Article 11 bis. It confirmed the realisation of observers in 1908 that the 
proponents of authors’ rights could not hope to continue their 
aggrandising activities without accommodating the interests of 
industries. It also introduced into the discourse of international 
copyright law the concept of the public interest. Finally, it suggested to 
the industries the possibility of organising themselves to secure rights 
analogous to those of copyright, the neighbouring rights. Their 
subsequent efforts resulted in the Rome Convention of 1961.17 
In Australia, government could now act on the basis of a principle 
previously considered doubtful but now certain – that international 
copyright law permitted it to introduce legislative restrictions to curb 
oppressive use of the performing right against radio broadcasters.  
The permission in Article 11 bis (2) allowed governments to become 
more assertive in regulating the performing right. The national 
legislature could now regulate the author’s exclusive right to authorise 
broadcasts, provided it did not prejudice the author’s right to obtain 
equitable remuneration.  
 The new formula, however, threw up new difficulties. The difficulties 
encountered in reaching agreement on performing right fees led the 
Government, in 1932, to establish the Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights. They also foreshadowed future difficulties in 
determining the meaning of the phrase “equitable remuneration”. 
As instructed, Raymond supplied in his report to the New Zealand 
Parliament suggestions for legislation to regulate the exercise of the  
performing right.18 It is not clear to what extent Raymond’s 
                                                     
17 The Berne Union would not accept inclusion of related or neighbouring rights, 
i.e., exclusive reproductive and distributive rights granted to record companies, 
broadcasters and performers, but the 1948 Brussels Revision Conference proposed 
that members study how to protect sound recordings. The result was the 
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations established in 1961 – the Rome 
Convention. 
18 In 1926, APRA claimed 10 per cent of the revenue of the Radio Broadcasting 
Company of New Zealand, which controlled the principal radio stations in the 
country. After the Government threatened legislative action to cap claims, APRA 
reduced its demand to 6 per cent. In 1927, further difficulties arose and RBC asked 
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recommendations encouraged the Australian Government in 
establishing the Royal Commission on Performing Rights. The 
Commission itself, however, paid close attention to his proposals, citing 
them in full in its Report.  
In the relevant part, Raymond argued that copyright legislation should 
be amended to resolve difficulties created by the performance right (the 
law, he said, “needs alteration to meet present-day conditions”), a 
system of compulsory licensing for broadcasting should be introduced 
(“to afford protection against overcharge and other abuses”), a 
“competent authority to deal with compensation in default of 
agreement” should be appointed, and allowance should be made for the 
requirements of educational broadcasting.  
The Royal Commission evidently agreed with at least one proposal, and 
recommended that the Government establish a tribunal to determine 
disputes relating to the public performance of musical works by 
broadcasting. The references in the Commission’s report to Raymond’s 
report, and Moore’s, were fitting. Without their work at the Rome 
Conference, it is possible that the Royal Commission would not have 
recommended the creation of a tribunal – a measure bitterly opposed 
by the suppliers of commercial music, and welcomed by users.  
                                                                                                           
the Government to legislate. After receiving Raymond’s report, the Government 
passed an Act in 1928 that provided that between (the retrospective date) October 
1927 and August 1929, unlicensed broadcasting of music did not infringe copyright. 
Under the Act, the Government deducted 7.5 per cent of revenue received from 
listeners’ licence fees during the period, and held the amount in trust for payment 
to validly claiming copyright owners. The legislation lapsed in 1929. The 
Government awarded the whole of the money to APRA, the sole claimant. 
